HE international monetary system has experienced significant changes during the l970s. The most dramatic of these has been the transformation from a system of pegged exchange rates to one in which central banks make no institutional commitment to maintain a particular exchange rate. Despite this change, central banks have been unwilling, in general, to allow their exchange rates to be completely market-determined and, consequently, continue to hold foreign reserves. The primary focus of this article is to analyze central banks' demand for foreign reserves in light of this institutional change.
Central banks generally are thought to hold stocks of foreign reserves so their economies can avoid incurring the costs of adjusting to every' international imbalance that would be transmitted to the domestic economy through changes in exchange rates. In particular, before March 1973, central banks participating in the Bretton Woods Agreement were compelled to hold foreign reserves because they were committed to intervene in foreign currency markets when the value of their currencies moved outside a predetermined range.
It was commonly believed that the demise of the Bretton Woods Agreement and the concomitant greater flexibility of exchange rates would reduce central banks' intervention in foreign currency markets and, consequently, reduce their demand fbr foreign reserves. That is, since perhaps the single, most important reason for holding reserves had diminished, cemitral banks would not he expected to hold such large stocks of foreign reserves as they had under the fixed exchange rate system. In spite of this expectation, however, central banks have continued to maintain sizable stocks of reserves since March
The atitho r would like to thank Jo tin B i Is On, \ Iiehae I Rn i'do a F:d Ray for their corn me, its on an earlier draft, 1973 . This observation has led researchers to condude that central banks have not changed appreciably their demand fbr reserves with the transition from a fixed to a floating exchange rate system.'
This conclusion, though potentially accurate, is founded on a fi-amework ofanalysis in which foreign reserves are considered by' central banks asavery' special type of asset -one held soie/rj to enable them to intervene in foreign currency markets. However, there is an alternative framework for analyzing central bank behavior that predicts that, even ifal I countries had adopted a completely cleanfloating exchange rate system in 1973, central banks would have continued to hold a variety of financial assets, some of which would have been classified as foreign reserves under the previous fixed exchange rate system. This article investigates which of these competing frameworks better explains central bank behavior since March 197.3.
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To analy'ze whether or not central bank behavior has changed significantly since the introduction of flexible exchange rates, the demand for reserves based on the intervention motive is compared with an alternative one developed within an asset-choice framework.
2 Only if the former explanation outperforms the latter for the floating period can one conclude that the changes in behavior since 1973 have been relatively minor and inconsequential.
The first model is the standard one based on the derived demand for foreign reserves for purposes of intervening in foreign exchange markets. Since this model has appeared frequently in the literature, its characteristics are only briefly descrihed.~The second model is based on asset-choice behavior and has not been applied, until now, to the analysis of foreign reserve demand. In this model, foreign reserves are treated as one of several assets that appear in a bank's portfolio and are held for the general conduct of monetary policy.
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The central bank intervention motive has been thoroughly investigated. Earlier studies typically have employed an optimizing approach in determining the demand for foreign reserves. One procedure is to find the stock of reserves at which the marginal costs of holding them equal the marginal benefits of using them to intervene in foreign currency markets (i.e., the avoidance of costs associated with the domestic economy having to adjust to each external shock). A second procedure is conducted in terms of welfare maximization under uncertainty. In particular, a central hank's demand for foreign reserves is the result of its maximizing a societal welfitre fi,nction which is a positive function of the expected level of real income and a negative function of its variability. Since the holding of foreign reserves diverts resources away from douiestic uses, the larger the stock of reserves, the lower the expected level of real income. However, if no reserves are held, the domestic economy would have to adjust to every external shock, resulting in more real income variability.
Employing the intervention motive within this framework, previous studies have identified four major deternnnants of reserve demand: the variability of international payments and receipts, the propensity to import, the opportunity cost ofholding reserves and a scale variable measuring the size of international transactions (usually the value of imports). The variability of receipts and payments measures the likelihood that external disequilibrium will occur, inducing the central bank to intervene in foreign currency markets in order to mitigate the impact of this disequilibrium on domestic markets. The larger the variability of a country's receipts and payments, the more susceptible is that country to external disequilibrium; consequently, the larger is the optimal stock of reserves desired for purposes of intervention.
There are two possible rationales fbr including the propensity to import as a determinant of reserve demand. First, the average propensity to import can be considered a measure of the degree of openness in an economy, thus indicating the degree to which the economy is vulnerable to an external disequilibrium. A second, alternative rationale sterns fromn the Keynesian model of an open economy in which an external disequilibrium could he corrected, without changing the exchange rate, by a change in output in proportion to the foreign trade multiplier. This output cost of adjustment could be avoided if the central hank used its stock of foreign reserves to finance (orto sterilize) the disequilibrium. Since this output cost is directly related to the size of the foreign trade mm,ltiplier, audi since this multiplier is inversely relatedi to the marginal propensity to import, the output cost of not holding sufficient reserves necessary to avoidl this adjustment and, thus, the central bank's dlemandl for reserves, must also he inversely related to the marginal propensity' to import. Because the marginal propensity' to import is difficult to measure, most studhes have substituted the average propensity' as a proxy'. However, if the average propensity to import is employed both asa proxy' forthe marginal propensity and as a measure of However, since a central bank also is faced with unanticipated economic events to which it may wish to respond, it must hold additional reserves to enable it to respondto these "unexpected" occurrences (or shocks) as well. These "precautionary" reserves may or may not be used for the conduct of monetary policy in any specific period, while the committed portion, is, by definition, fully involved in the monetary control process. Consequently, a central bank is concerned only with the yield (cost) on the potentially idle, precautionary portion. That is, a central bank's demand for the assets that form the committed componentis hypothesized to be insensitive to their relative yields, whereas the composition of the precautionary (or uncommitted) reserve component is hypothesized to be sensitive to changes in relative asset yields.
To formalize this discussion of central bank behavior, assume that a central bank (subject to certain constraints) desires to maximize its "ability" to respond to unanticipated events. It accomplishes this by maximizing the uncommitted portion of its 
(xj-~) Solving (3') liar flj yields:
Solving (6') for x 1 yields:
which is the system represented by (3) in the text. Itcan he shown that the own-price elasticity csf demand for asset •i is y~(1-/3~) 8')~= -1 * and that the Allen partial elasticity of substitution between assets i and j is
For (x( -7k~> 0 all assets are Flicksian substitutes.
'The value of 7k is determined hy tlso se variahles that influence each country s monetary policy decisions (e.g., economic activity, 1 in employsn ent, inflation). Certainly, interest rates may I included in this group of detersssiiants. 1-lowever, since 7kẽ stimated, the hvpothe sized interest insensitivity of a portion ofa central hank's portfolio can he easily tested. Specifically, if 7k is statistically significant, the hypothesis that a central bank holds a portion of its portfolio for re aso, is other than relative vie IrIs cannot be rejected Also, the hvpothe sis that on,, part of the portfolio is sensitive to change s in interest rates can I Se tested by testing the statistical significance of $. he resulting system of asset-demand equations is as follows:'
It is clear from equation 3 that a central hank's demand foreach asset in its portfolio has two primary components. The first is the required or connnittecl portion (yk). which is determined regardless ofyields. The second, or precautionary, component is the 'All assets are assomed to mat,ire in orre Pcri on, hut lange s-I ived as sets enold be included without a substantive change in the analysis. Also, since tlse issue investigated here is a central hank's al loe;-ition of a 4 C en portfolio ass'u ng 'aria, is assets, the determination of the size of the portfolio in any tiisie period (TA The use of imports as a scale variable and the average propensity to import as an indicator of openness have been discussed above. The trend-adjusted variance ofcountry i's stock of foreign reserves is a proxy for the variability of international receipts and expenditures. It is calculated using a method similar to Frenkel's.h1
The measure of opportunity cost employed is the ratio of the discount rate in each countsy to the threemonth Eurodollar deposit rate. For a given portfolio of assets, the discount rate represents a measure of the foregone earnings of central banks as a result of holding assets in the form of foreign reserves; the tlsree-n,onth Eurodollar deposit rate is a measure of the income earned from invested foreign reserves. 
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The ratiortale for this is that central banks Isold most of their foreign reserves in the form of U.S. dollars. Instead of holding idle balances of dollars, central banks typically invest their reserves in some shortterm asset in order to maintain a relatively high degree of liquidity; hence, the ratio (or log difference) measures the net foregone yield. Consequently, an appropriate yield on invested foreign reserves is a sisort-term interest rate on dollar-denominated assets.' 2
The sample employed consists of seven countries fbr the time period 1/1964 to IV/1979 .ma The countries included are Denmark, France, West Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. The United States is not included because it is considered to be the primary supplier of foreign reserves. The data set consists of a pooling of crosssection and time-series observations.
The possibilities that country-specific variation may he present and that a lagged adjustment process may exist are provided for in the following assumed autoregressive error structure:
where Pi = autocorrelation paranseter for country i, = white noise random error.
Including a separate autocorrelation parameter for each country captures the country-specific variation ' 5 1'he discount rate is empl rayed becassse, eyes, th nsugli it is not market-determined, its nsoyen,ent closely parallels n,arket rates in the countries in tlse sample. Also, since n,ost of the central banks studied use imstcrest rates as a mechanism of monetary control. the discnsus,t rate reflects conditiosss in the respective credit markets. Government sec ,~i ritics us ssrkets are sot sssiffciently developed in all nsf the countries to he able to use an interest rate from that asarket. The Eurodollar nheposit rate is mssed as the yield on foreigss reserve stocks even though other cnrrencie s are Iseld as foreign reserves mid evesi though sonic eesstral hasiks have refrained generally fron, issvesting in the Eurodollar market directly. The jsistiflcations liar this are: (a) the U.S. dollar is still the n,s~or reserve currency, comprising 66 to 75 percent of the foreign reserves held by central banks, (hi) some cesstral hatsks do invest nlirecthy its the E uronlollar sssarket tvh,i Ic others invest indirectly using the Bank for I nte rssatiomsal Settlemes,ts as as, isstennediary and (c) the nsajor alterr,atiye trs the Eurodollar n,arket is the market liar U.S -Treasury hills. However, since the three-nsonth Eurodollar i-ate and the tlsreensonth Treasury bill rate move very closely together, they yield virtually inlentical results when employed individssally in the estin,ation of both the intervention and the asset-choice models. Finally, the ratio has been criticized as simply a proxy for the forward discount or prenssuns on the curreiscies inchtided. However, when the cocered ratio is substituted for the usseoverenl one, mso sigssificant qualitative cliasiges occur.
"TIse saniple period extends to l\-'/198f) for Japan, West Germany and the Neth,erlas,ds. Gross ds,mcstic product data were not a~-ailah,lefor tlse other countries in tbse sample for thsis extended ,erind. v lees
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'The amp e pe sod extend to lV/t980 I or Japan, Wes Germ n and the Netherlands Signit cant y diffe nt 1 cm zero at the 5 p roent level.
and also provides a means of introducing dynamic the Smithsonian Agreement, that is, between the behavior into the model.14 second and third quarters of 1973.16 Finally, the date of the switch from fixed to floating The results obtained from estimating the solution exchange rates must be identified. Since the data are of equations 4 and 5 over the two time periods inpooled, it is extremely difficult to identify the break dicated above are reported in table 1. Several difpoint as occurring at a specific point in time. It is ferences in the estimated relationsisips for the two likely the switch occurred over different intervals for periods-are apparent. First, the import elasticity (aj) each country analyzed. ' 5 Experimentation with in the fixed exchange rate period is significantly various breakpoints-around the March 1973 collapse larger than that in the floating rate period, In fact, the of the Smithsonian Agreement yielded no single importelasticityinthefixedperiodisnotstatistically quarter as the most likely break point for all of the different fron, one, which indicates that central bank countries in the sample. Consequently, the break is holdings of foreign reserves do not exhibit econsimply-assumed to coincide with the actual failure of omies of scale during that period. Second, the magnitude ofthe response to changes in variability (a3) is "For further explasiatinsn, see Jobsn F. U. Bilson and Jacols A. Frenke I. '' Dyna,, sic Amhj ustmesit and the Dens, and for Is,terr,a-
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ens,str isised hi this tsr cm s 5st, to ch,oosc tbse s sssie hi c sk pusist fir tihi ststuted s ntu equation 4, the result is oh seri-atmos,alh y equlv-.
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inhenticah sassmplc periods-Also, liar each ,,,onlel, the l,ypothesis ''This is supported h-i-Frenkel, ''bsstemnatin,,al Reserves, '' pp. that the estis,,ated parameters hefiase this poisit are equal to 122-25; and Sainhi, ''The Square-Root Law, Uncertainty and those after this point is re~ectemlat the 5 percent cm,s,fidencc Is,ters,atinss,al Reserves, '' pp. 280-83. level.
larger under floating tl,an under fixed rates, This is somewhat paradoxical since one snight expect that the is,creased exchange rate flexibility duris,g the floatis,g rate period wotsld serve as a buffer as,d, cos,sequentl~', reduce ces,tral bas,ks' s'esponse to cl,anges in variability.T l,ird, the sensitivity of central banks' reserve holdis,gs to is,terest rate changes under fixed rates (a~)is insignificas,t, a result similar to tl,at of other studies,18 Alternativeb-, usider floating rates. central banks-are fhnnd to respos~clis, a significant and conceptual h-consistent n,anner to changes in interest rates. Whess con,pared with those of previous studies, these results suggest tI,at an interest rate differesitial is a better measure of the opportunity' cost ofholdis,g reserves. Finally', a coniparison of the intercepts (acj) suggests that central banks are holdis,g larger stocks of foreign reserves, osi ax-erage, is, the floating rate period1 than they-did in, the fixed rate period, inchcatistg that they have actual ly-added to their stocks during the floating period. j/?4y,~-pJ_~UPS-Cc
To estis,,ate the system of asset-den,ancl equations represented by equation 3, it was assumed tl,at normally distributed randon, errors enter additivelywith zero s,,ean and constant variance. .ks a result of introducing a randoni component in this snarsrser, the sum of the error terms across all equatiosis in the systes,, must equal zero if the systesn is to be cos,-sistent.' 9 This restriction on the error structtsre, byintrodsscing linear dependence across equations, has at least two isnportant isTsphications for estin,ation, First, single-equation estimating techniques are irsappropriate. Efficient estimation requires the use of a system technique. Secos,cl, the covariance snatrix of the es,tire system is sis,gular. Because of tl,is, a full- infk,rn,atiosi techniqsse cannot be esnployed on the es,tire system of 51 asset-den,as,cl equatios~ssisnul-taneouslv becansse tl~einversion of this covarsas,ce matrix is required during the estimation proct-sss. Consequently, only 51-1 equations cas~he estin,atecl sisntsltas,eously.20
The cossntries and tin,e periods employed l~ereare ides,tical to those used iss estisnating the intervention s,,odel. Tl,e, assets of tile ces~tral banks of these consntries are aggregated into three categories: foreign reserves, claims on governn,ent and claisns Os, coms,,ercial baslks. The is,terest rates used for tl,cse asset groups are tile three-mos,th Eurodollar deposit rate (for foreigs, reserves), short-tern, government bond yield is' country i (for claims on gov-erns,,ent) an,cl the discount rate in, i (for claisus on cosns,,ercial has,ks). The three-month Ensrodollar rate is used here fbr tl,e sasne reason it was usedl is, the estimation of the intervention snodel. Also, a dy'nas,,ic specification is employ-ed to capture lagged adjustsnent of the committed parameters (yk) hy allowing then~to vary' over time. This dynamic feature is is,trocluced into the systen~hy assuming tl,at the cos,,mitted level of each asset is a fnss,ction of the total l,olding of that assetduring thc-, previous tin,e period as follows: proportioslal relationship i,etwees, the con,mitted level of asset k is, ti,e ctsrres,t period to tl,e total i,olding of that asset in the preceding period. Finally, tile date of the switch frosn fixed to floating exchas,ge rates is the sasne as isi estis,,ating the isiterves,tion model. Substituting equatios, 6 is~toequatiom, 3 and recognizing tl,at m,=3 in this case, the resulting s steni of asset-cleu,and equatiosms is as follows: centage of their discretionary portfbhio that central = the yield on asset) in counts-y i finn, liebas,ks heidi in the fonn of foreign reserves (rns) fell ginssing tss essd of tin,e pcrnod t, significantly from the fixed to the floating period.
TA 51 = th,e value of l's portlkshmcs at hegislning Thse sensitivity of the demansci for foreign reserves to of pericsd t. changes in interest rates (as measured by-the abso---= errcsr tersui lute value of the price elasticity of demand) also fell --fron~.563 in the fixed rate period 1 to .289 in the Table 2 presents the results of estinnating ti,e above floathng rate period 1 . Nonetheless, tile fact that this systesss on,itting equation 7,321 A finlh-infon,lation, percentage is statistically significant in both periods n,aximun,-hikehih,ood techniqnse is used to obtain indicates tl~atreserve holdings are at least partially efficient estimates.
sensitive to changes in interest rates, All paramlieter estimates are statistically sigs,ificant Takem~together. the changes in~Os andh~s over tile and within conceptually acceptable ranges of values.
two periods shedh sosne light on why Hehler anti Khan As before, differences between time periods, hut consistently ocerpredict central bank den,and for also across assets, are readhily apparent. In particular, foreign reserves dhtlring the floating periocl. 2 n In their the estimated comss,ittecl parameter fhr fhreign remodheh, central banks hold foreign reserves solely to serves (01) is relatively-constant across time periods, intervene in foreign exchange n,arkets. Alternaim,dilcating that central banks have not alteredi tl~e~tively, in the asset-cl,oic'e modeh, interventios, is cosni,litted portion of ti,eir foreign reserves in the simply one of several n,otives (where th~e committech move froni fixed to floating exchas,ge rates. On the paran~eter n,easures the dlen,and for reserves for Table 4 Residual Variance Estimates 11964-41/1973 Intervention Table 4 presents tile r suIt of both of these trans fonnatsons.
E 'wept for th logarithmic specification estimated n-icr the fixed rate period the asset-choice modc I ippears to outp rform the intes v ention modeh. One final questiosu ren,ains to lie answered: Are the assets in central banks' portfolios close substitutes for cads other? To answer this question, partial elasticities of substitution are calculated for each of the asset pairs over each time period. Since these elasticities are fus,ctinns, inter alia, of the committed and us,cos,,mnittedh levels of each asset, the elasticities reportedl are evaluated using the mean holdings of the relevant assets (table 3) . Gives, the relatively high estimatedi values of the conlmnittedi parameters, These results, however, must lie qualified. Tile it is not too surprising to find that none (if tile-~ss-sets residual-varias,ce method presupposes that one (if are close substitutes, the specifications is the correct one, a sonlewilat presumptuous supposition. Also, in this case tile two 
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The ultimate test (ifa structssral model is how well it preshcts behavior. This sectios, comnpares the predlictive abilities of the two m,,odhels described above.
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ii it-it] v eosltad ml cxii lanatnrv van mu] ii c-s thu mit me pies ems t tIme ii,-tervesutioii ssssstms'e, it is fus,mdaosesutahlv sssissjieeillerl. however, tis e e stiissmstio si ssf tlut, assc t-ehoicc laos heI ch emil-i v ii, niic:sste s ti smut thus-lou-c igo re-serve cit-n, asum (is of' c-c-i, trail hmsss k s are sc-i'siti ye to vicmi s on cstlmen missets is, thut-I r portfcs lics. Si rice thẽ isste ri-esstiois us scicleh igmuuss-e s tl sc-se explas,atss my vaumiash sic's, it is al so l's mu udmuoieotmuhiv nuisspceihed, Cnss,sesjoesstiv, fustusre nuscaurc:ls slicimslri [us-clinc-etc-cl at c:ss mushii using tise featmssc-s ni haitI s ci I thsc-sr mis side Is Is, uieei iv enri-eel I y ml c-cus trash luau!, k's sir-mmii mc 1 him fssrt-i gsu rest, mvi's - suit' are unambiguous. When confronted with the 'data and the asset-choice model as an alternative, the intervention model must be rejected. Alternatively, the asset-choice model cannot be rejected. This conclusion is invariant across sample periods. While the rejection of the intervention model for the floating rate period is not unexpected, it is certainly interesting that this model is also rejected for the fixed rate period. This result confirms that the assetchoice model provides a more general explanation of central banks' demand for reserves than does the intervention model.
N-1.N--IARY A.NI) CONC.LU S ION
The purpose of this article has been to compare central bank behavior before and after the movesilent to floating exchange rates within the framework of two alternative models of a central bank's demand for foreign reserves. In the first model, necessary eonchtion for the use of this test is that both niodeis expimuin tlue same depenniesst variable. Imu this ease, the first eqmuation of the asset-choice modei explains the quantity of reserves ciemamuded while the inten'enticis, nuodel explains the lcsgarid/s so rif'th,e qnasutity of nesem-ves demanded. Cninseqsuentlv, to penfhns,u the Cox test, the asiti-log of the intervesution uu~odel (i.e., a non-lis,ean, Colihi-Dniugias-type fussuetion) is estimated using a unaximun~-l ikehihood procedure. The resulting prechicted -i-allies and estisnated paranieters are essentiaiiy icles,tieal to those nihitaim,ech frost a least-squares estisnatiosi of the ioghnear fsunctiom,ai fiimnu. foreign reserves are treated as a special type of asset, omie demanded solel~-to enable a central hank to intervene in foreign currency markets. The second model considers foreign reserves to be the same asand also to he held for the same reasons as any other asset within a central bank's portfolio.
The estimation of the asset-choice nuodel as an alternative to the intervention model yielded several interesting results. First, a central bank's demand for foreign reserves is sensitive to relative changes in the yields of the assets in the portfolio. Second, central banks consider foreign reserves as substitotes to other assets in their portfolio, Third, the decrease in the percentage of the uncommitted portfolio composed of foreign reserves is identified as a possible reason for the usual overprediction of reserve demand by the intervention model in the floating rate period. Finally-, and sluost importantly, the asset-choice sluodel cosisistently outperforms the intervention s,uodlel.
Since the testing procedure employed could lead to the rejection of both models, the fact that the asset-choice model cannot he rejected in either sample period is an extremely robust result. Tise implication is simply that, regardless of exchange rate regime, central banks hold foreign reserves for a wide variety of purposes -not just for intervention in foreign exchange markets. Consequently, the investigation of whether or not central banks' general behavior has changed with the movement to a system of floating exchange rates within the framework of the intervention n,odel appears to be misdirected. Investigation should focus on the arguments, instead of the parameters, within the demand function.
